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Abstract. We discuss a crowd-based theory for describing the collective behavior
in Complex Systems comprising multi-agent populations competing for a limited
resource. These systems – whose binary versions we refer to as B-A-R (Binary
Agent Resource) systems – have a dynamical evolution which is determined by
the aggregate action of the heterogeneous, adaptive agent population. Accounting
for the strong correlations between agents’ strategies, yields an accurate analytic
description of the system’s dynamics.
1 Introduction
Complex Systems – together with their dynamical behavior known as Com-
plexity – are thought to pervade much of the natural, informational, sociolog-
ical, and economic world [1,2]. Complex Systems are probably best defined
in terms of a list of common features which distinguish them from ‘simple’
systems, and from systems which are just ‘complicated’ as opposed to being
complex. A list of Complex System ‘stylized facts’ should include: feedback
and adaptation at the macroscopic and/or microscopic level, many (but not
too many) interacting parts, non-stationarity, evolution, coupling with the
environment, and observed dynamics which depend upon the particular re-
alization of the system.
Casti has argued that [1] ‘.... a decent mathematical formalism to describe
and analyze the [so-called] El Farol Problem would go a long way toward
the creation of a viable theory of complex, adaptive systems’. The rationale
behind this statement is that the El Farol Problem, which was originally
proposed by Brian Arthur [3] to demonstrate the essence of Complexity in
financial markets involving many interacting agents, incorporates the key fea-
tures of a Complex System in an everyday setting. Very briefly, the El Farol
Problem concerns the collective decision-making of a group of potential bar-
goers (i.e. agents) who repeatedly try to predict whether they should attend
a potentially overcrowded bar on a given night each week. They have no
information about the others’ predictions. Indeed the only information avail-
able to each agent is global, comprising a string of outcomes (‘overcrowded’
or ‘undercrowded’) for a limited number of previous occasions. Hence they
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end up having to predict the predictions of others. No ‘typical’ agent exists,
since all such typical agents would then make the same decision, hence ren-
dering their common prediction scheme useless. With the exception of Ref.
[4], the physics literature has focused on a simplified binary form of the El
Farol Problem called the Minority Game (MG) as introduced by Challet and
Zhang [5,6].
In this paper, we present a theoretical framework for describing a class of
Complex Systems comprising competitive multi-agent populations, which we
refer to as B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource) systems. The resulting Crowd-
Anticrowd theory is not limited to MG-like games, even though we focus on
MG-like games in order to demonstrate the accuracy of the approach. The
theory is built around the correlations or ‘crowding’ in strategy-space. Since
the theory only makes fairly modest assumptions about a specific game’s
dynamical behavior, it can describe the dynamics in a wide variety of systems
comprising competitive populations [7].
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource) system. At
timestep t, each agent decides between action −1 and action +1 based on the
predictions of the S strategies that he possesses. A total of n
−1[t] agents choose
−1, and n+1[t] choose +1. Agents may be subject to some underlying network
structure which may be static or evolving, and ordered or disordered (see Refs.
[7,8]). The agents’ actions are aggregated, and a global outcome 0 or 1 is assigned.
Strategies are rewarded/penalized one virtual point according to whether their
predicted action would have been a winning/losing action.
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2 B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource) Systems
Figure 1 summarizes the generic form of the B-A-R (Binary Agent Resource)
system under consideration. At timestep t, each agent (e.g. a bar customer,
a commuter, or a market agent) decides whether to enter a game where the
choices are action +1 (e.g. attend the bar, take route A, or buy) and action
−1 (e.g. go home, take route B, or sell). The global information available
to the agents is a common memory of the most recent m outcomes, which
are represented as either 0 (e.g. bar attendance below seating capacity L)
or 1 (e.g. bar attendance above seating capacity L). Hence this outcome
history is represented by a binary bit-string of length m. For general m,
there will be P = 2m possible history bit-strings. These history bit-strings
can alternatively be represented in decimal form: µ = {0, 1, ..., P − 1}. For
m = 2, for example, µ = 0 corresponds to 00, µ = 1 corresponds to 01 etc.
A strategy consists of a predicted action, −1 or +1, for each possible history
bit-string. Hence there are 2P=2
m
possible strategies.
Fig. 2. Strategy Space for m = 2, together with some example strategies (left).
The strategy space shown is known as the Full Strategy Space (FSS) and contains
all possible permutations of the actions −1 and +1 for each history. There are 22
m
strategies in the FSS. The 2m dimensional hypercube (right) shows all 22
m
strategies
in the FSS at its vertices. The shaded strategies form a Reduced Strategy Space
RSS. There are 2.2m = 2P strategies in the RSS. The grey shaded line connects
two strategies with a Hamming distance separation of 4.
Figure 2 shows the m = 2 strategy space from Figure 1. A strategy is a set
of instructions to describe what action an agent should take, given any par-
ticular history µ. The strategy space is the set of strategies from which agents
are allocated their strategies. The strategy space shown is known as the Full
Strategy Space (FSS) and contains all possible permutations of the actions
−1 and +1 for each history. As such there are 22
m
strategies in this space.
One can choose a subset of 2.2m strategies, called a Reduced Strategy Space
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(RSS), such that any pair within this subset has one of the following two char-
acteristics: (i) Anti-correlated. For example, any two agents using the (m = 2)
strategies (−1,−1,+1,+1) and (+1,+1,−1,−1) respectively, would take the
opposite action irrespective of the sequence of previous outcomes and hence
the history. Their net effect on the excess demand D[t] = n+1[t] − n−1[t]
(which is an important quantity in a socio-economic setting such as a fi-
nancial market) therefore cancels out at each timestep, regardless of the
history. Hence they will not contribute to fluctuations in D[t]. (ii) Uncor-
related. For example, any two agents using the strategies (−1,−1,−1,−1)
and (−1,−1,+1,+1) respectively, would take the opposite action for two of
the four histories, and the same action for the remaining two histories. If
the histories occur equally often, the actions of the two agents will be un-
correlated on average. Note that the strategies in the RSS can be labeled by
R = {1, 2, ..., 2P = 2.2m}.
The strategy allocation among agents can be described in terms of a
tensor Ω describing the distribution of strategies among the N individual
agents. This strategy allocation is typically fixed from the beginning of the
game, hence acting as a quenched disorder in the system. The rank of the
tensor Ω is given by the number of strategies S that each agent holds. We
note that a single Ω ‘macrostate’ corresponds to many possible ‘microstates’
describing the specific partitions of strategies among the agents. Hence the
present Crowd-Anticrowd theory retained at the level of a given Ω, describes
the set of all games which belong to that same Ω macrostate. We also note
that although Ω is not symmetric, it can be made so since the agents do not
distinguish between the order in which the two strategies are picked. Given
this, we will henceforth focus on S = 2 and consider the symmetrized version
of the strategy allocation matrix given by Ψ = 12 (Ω +Ω
T ).
3 Crowd-Anticrowd Formalism
Consider an arbitrary timestep t during a run of the game. We will focus
on evaluating the ‘excess demand’ D[t] ≡ D [S[t], µ[t]] = n+1[t] − n−1[t],
although any other function of n+1[t] and n−1[t] can be evaluated in a similar
way. Here S[t] is the 2P -dimensional score-vector whose R’th component
is the virtual point score for strategy R. [Strategies gain/lose one virtual
point at each timestep, according to whether their predicted action would
have been a winning/losing action]. The current history is µ[t]. The standard
deviation of D[t] for this given run, corresponds to a time-average for a given
realization of Ψ and a given set of initial conditions. Summing over the RSS,
we have:D [S[t], µ[t]] =
∑2P
R=1 a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R . The quantity a
µ[t]
R = ±1 is the action
predicted by strategy R in response to the history bit-string µ at time t. The
quantity n
S[t]
R is the number of agents using strategy R at time t. We use the
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notation 〈X [t]〉t to denote a time-average over the variable X [t] for a given
Ψ . Hence
〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉t =
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
2P∑
R=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R
〉
t
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
(1)
where we have used the property that a
µ[t]
R and n
S[t]
R are uncorrelated. We
now consider the special case in which all histories are visited equally on
average: even if this situation does not hold for a specific Ψ , it may indeed
hold once the averaging over Ψ has also been taken. For example, in the
Minority Game all histories are visited equally at small m and a given Ψ . If
we take the additional average over all Ψ , then the same is also true for large
m. Under the property of equal histories:
〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉t =
2P∑
R=1
(
1
P
P−1∑
µ=0
a
µ[t]
R
)〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
(2)
=
P∑
R=1
(
1
P
P−1∑
µ=0
a
µ[t]
R + a
µ[t]
R
)〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
P∑
R=1
0.
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
= 0
where we have used the exact result that a
µ[t]
R = −a
µ[t]
R
for all µ[t], and the
approximation
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
. This approximation is reasonable for a
competitive game since there is typically no a priori best strategy: if the
strategies are distributed fairly evenly among the agents, this then implies
that the average number playing each strategy is approximately equal and
hence
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
〈
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
. In the event that all histories are not equally
visited over time, even after averaging over all Ψ , it may still happen that
the system’s dynamics is restricted to equal visits to some subset of histories.
In this case one can then carry out the averaging in Equation (2) over this
subspace of histories. More generally, the averagings in this formalism can be
carried out with appropriate frequency weightings for each history. In fact,
any non-ergodic dynamics can be incorporated if one knows the appropriate
history path [8].
The variance of the excess demand D[t] is given by
σ2Ψ =
〈
D [S[t], µ[t]]
2
〉
t
− 〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉
2
t . (3)
For simplicity, we will here assume the game output is unbiased and hence
〈D [S[t], µ[t]]〉t = 0. Hence
σ2Ψ =
〈
D [S[t], µ[t]]
2
〉
t
=
2P∑
R,R′=1
〈
a
µ[t]
R n
S[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′ n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
. (4)
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Using the identities aR.aR′ = P (fully correlated), aR.aR′ = −P (fully anti-
correlated), and aR.aR′ = 0 (fully uncorrelated) where aR is a vector of
dimension P with components a
µ[t]
R for µ[t] = 1, 2, ..., P , we obtain
σ2Ψ =
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R
〉
t
+
2P∑
R 6=R′ 6=R
〈
a
µ[t]
R a
µ[t]
R′
〉
t
〈
n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R′
〉
t
=
2P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R
〉
t
. (5)
The sum over 2P terms can be written equivalently as a sum over P terms,
σ2Ψ =
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− n
S[t]
R n
S[t]
R
+
(
n
S[t]
R
)2
− n
S[t]
R
n
S[t]
R
〉
t
=
P∑
R=1
〈(
n
S[t]
R − n
S[t]
R
)2〉
t
≡
〈
P∑
R=1
(
n
S[t]
R − n
S[t]
R
)2〉
t
.
The values of n
S[t]
R and n
S[t]
R
for each R will depend on the precise form of Ψ .
The ensemble-average over all possible realizations of the strategy allocation
matrix Ψ is denoted by 〈...〉Ψ . Using the notation
〈
σ2Ψ
〉
Ψ
= σ2, yields
σ2 =
〈〈
P∑
R=1
(
n
S[t]
R − n
S[t]
R
)2〉
t
〉
Ψ
. (6)
It is straightforward to obtain analogous expressions for the variances in
n+1[t] and n−1[t].
Equation (6) provides us with an expression for the time-averaged fluctu-
ations. Some form of approximation must be introduced in order to reduce
Equation (6) to explicit analytic expressions. It turns out that Equation (6)
can be manipulated in a variety of ways, depending on the level of approxima-
tion that one is prepared to make. The precise form of any resulting analytic
expression will depend on the details of the approximations made. Adopting
one such approach which is well-suited to the low m regime, we start by re-
labelling the strategies. Specifically, the sum in Equation (6) is re-written to
be over a virtual-point ranking K as opposed to R. Consider the variation in
points for a given strategy, as a function of time for a given realization of Ψ .
The ranking (i.e. label) of a given strategy in terms of virtual-points score
will typically change in time since the individual strategies have a variation
in virtual-points which also varies in time. For the Minority Game, this vari-
ation is quite rapid in the low m regime of interest, since there are many
more agents than available strategies – hence any strategy emerging as the
instantaneously highest-scoring, will immediately get played by many agents
and therefore be likely to lose on the next time-step. More general games in-
volving competition within a multi-agent population, will typically generate
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a similar ecology of strategy-scores with no all-time winner. This implies that
the specific identity of the ‘K’th highest-scoring strategy’ changes frequently
in time. It also implies that n
S[t]
R varies considerably in time. Therefore in
order to proceed, we shift the focus onto the time-evolution of the highest-
scoring strategy, second highest-scoring strategy etc. This should have a much
smoother time-evolution than the time-evolution for a given strategy. In the
case that the strategies all start off with zero points, the anticorrelated strate-
gies appear as the mirror-image, i.e. SK [t] = −SK [t]. The label K is used to
denote the rank in terms of strategy score, i.e. K = 1 is the highest scoring
strategy position, K = 2 is the second highest-scoring strategy position etc.
with
SK=1 > SK=2 > SK=3 > SK=4 > ... (7)
assuming no strategy-ties. Given that SR = −SR (i.e. all strategy scores
start off at zero), then we know that SK = −SK . Equation (6) can hence be
rewritten exactly as
σ2 =
〈〈
P∑
K=1
(
n
S[t]
K − n
S[t]
K
)2〉
t
〉
Ψ
. (8)
Since in the systems of interest the agents are typically playing their highest-
scoring strategies, then the relevant quantity in determining how many agents
will instantanously play a given strategy, is a knowledge of its relative ranking
– not the actual value of its virtual points score. This suggests that the quan-
tities n
S[t]
K and n
S[t]
K
will fluctuate relatively little in time, and that we should
now develop the problem in terms of time-averaged values. We can rewrite
the number of agents playing the strategy in position K at any timestep t, in
terms of some constant value nK plus a fluctuating term n
S[t]
K = nK + εK [t].
We assume that one can choose a suitable constant nK such that the fluctu-
ation εK [t] represents a small noise term. Hence,
σ2 =
〈
P∑
K=1
〈[
nK + εK [t]− nK − εK [t]
]2〉
t
〉
Ψ
(9)
≈
〈
P∑
K=1
〈[
nK − nK
]2〉
t
〉
Ψ
=
〈
P∑
K=1
[
nK − nK
]2〉
Ψ
,
assuming the noise terms have averaged out to be small. The averaging over
Ψ can now be taken inside the sum. Each term can then be rewritten exactly
using the joint probability distribution for nK and nK , which we shall call
P (nK , nK). Hence
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
〈[
nK − nK
]2〉
Ψ
=
P∑
K=1
N∑
nK=0
N∑
n
K
=0
[
nK − nK
]2
P (nK , nK).(10)
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We now look at Equation (10) in the limiting case where the averaging over
the quenched disorder matrix is dominated by matrices Ψ which are nearly
flat. This will be a good approximation in the ‘crowded’ limit of small m
in which there are many more agents than available strategies, since the
standard deviation of an element in Ψ (i.e. the standard deviation in bin-size)
is then much smaller than the mean bin-size. The probability distribution
P (nK , nK) will then be sharply peaked around the nK and nK values given
by the mean values for a flat quenched-disorder matrix Ψ . We label these
mean values as nK and nK . Hence P (nK , nK) = δnK ,nKδnK ,nK and so
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
[
nK − nK
]2
. (11)
There is a very simple interpretation of Equation (11). It represents the sum
of the variances for each Crowd-Anticrowd pair. For a given strategy K there
is an anticorrelated strategy K. The nK agents using strategy K are doing
the opposite of the n
K
agents using strategy K irrespective of the history
bit-string. Hence the effective group-size for each Crowd-Anticrowd pair is
neffK = nK−nK : this represents the net step-size d of the Crowd-Anticrowd
pair in a random-walk contribution to the total variance. Hence, the net
contribution by this Crowd-Anticrowd pair to the variance is given by
[σ2]
KK
= 4pqd2 = 4.
1
2
.
1
2
[neffK ]
2 =
[
nK − nK
]2
(12)
where p = q = 1/2 for a random walk. Since all the strong correlations have
been included (i.e. anti-correlations) it can therefore be assumed that the
separate Crowd-Anticrowd pairs execute random walks which are uncorre-
lated with respect to each other. [Recall the properties of the RSS - all the
remaining strategies are uncorrelated.] Hence the total variance is given by
the sum of the individual variances,
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
[σ2]
KK
=
P∑
K=1
[
nK − nK
]2
, (13)
which corresponds exactly to Equation (11). If strategy-ties occur frequently,
then one has to be more careful about evaluating nK since its value may be
affected by the tie-breaking rule. We will show elsewhere that this becomes
quite important in the case of very small m in the presence of network con-
nections [8] - this is because very small m naturally leads to crowding in
strategy space and hence mean-reverting virtual scores for strategies. This
mean-reversion is amplified further by the presence of network connections
which increases the crowding, thereby increasing the chance of strategy ties.
4 Implementation of Crowd-Anticrowd Theory
Here we evalute the Crowd-Anticrowd expressions, in the important limiting
case of small m. Since there are many more agents than available strategies,
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Fig. 3. Schematic representation of the strategy allocation matrix Ψ with m = 2
and S = 2, in the RSS. The strategies are ranked according to strategy score, and
are labelled by the rank K. In the limit that Ψ is essentially flat, then the number of
agents playing the K’th highest-scoring strategy, is just proportional to the number
of shaded bins at that K.
crowding effects will be important. Each element of Ψ has a mean of N/(2P )S
agents per ‘bin’. In the case of small m and hence densely-filled Ψ , the fluctu-
ations in the number of agents per bin will be small compared to this mean
value – hence the matrix Ψ looks uniform or ‘flat’ in terms of the occupa-
tion numbers in each bin. Figure 3 provides a schematic representation of Ψ
with m = 2, S = 2, in the RSS. If the matrix Ψ is indeed flat, then any re-
ordering due to changes in the strategy ranking has no effect on the form of
the matrix. Therefore the number of agents playing the K’th highest-scoring
strategy, will always be proportional to the number of shaded bins at that K
(see Fig. 3 for K = 3). For general m and S, one finds
nK =
N
(2P )S
[S(2P −K)S−1 +
S(S − 1)
2
(2P −K)S−2 + ...+ 1] (14)
=
N
(2P )S
S−1∑
r=0
S!
(S − r)!r!
[2P −K]r
=
N
(2P )S
([2P −K + 1]S − [2P −K]S)
= N.
([
1−
(K − 1)
2P
]S
−
[
1−
K
2P
]S)
,
with P ≡ 2m. In the case where each agent holds two strategies, S = 2, nK
can be simplified to
nK = N.
([
1−
(K − 1)
2P
]2
−
[
1−
K
2P
]2)
=
(2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N . (15)
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Hence
σ2 =
P∑
K=1
[
(2m+2 − 2K + 1)
22(m+1)
N −
(2K − 1)
22(m+1)
N
]2
(16)
=
N2
22(2m+1)
P∑
K=1
[2m+1 − 2K + 1]2 =
N2
3.2m
(1− 2−2(m+1)) .
This derivation has assumed that there are no strategy ties – more pre-
cisely, we have assumed that the game rules governing strategy ties do not
upset the identical forms of the rankings in terms of highest virtual points
and popularity. Hence we have overestimated the size of the Crowds using
high-ranking strategies, and underestimated the size of the Anticrowds using
low-ranking strategies. Therefore the analytic form for σ will overestimate
the numerical value, as is indeed seen in Figure 4. Notwithstanding this over-
estimation, there is remarkably good agreement between the numerical re-
sults and our analytic theory. In a similar way to the above calculation, the
Crowd-Anticrowd theory can be extended to deal with the important com-
plementary regimes of (i) non-flat quenched disorder matrix Ψ , at small m,
and (ii) non-flat quenched disorder matrix Ψ , at large m. As shown in Figure
4, the agreement for these regimes is also excellent [2,7].
The Crowd-Anticrowd theory has also been applied successfully to various
generalizations of the Minority Game. For example, excellent agreement be-
tween the resulting analytic expressions and numerical simulations has been
demonstrated for (i) Alloy Minority Game [9], (ii) Thermal Minority Game
(TMG) [10,11], (iii) Thermal Alloy Minority Game [12], and (iv) B-A-R sys-
tems with an underlying network structure [7].
5 Conclusion and Discussions
We have given an overview of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory for competitive
multi-agent systems, in particular those based on an underlying binary struc-
ture. Explicit analytic expressions can be evaluated at various levels of ap-
proximation, yielding very good agreement with numerical simulations. We
note that the crucial element of this Crowd-Anticrowd theory – i.e. properly
accounting for the dominant inter-agent correlations – is not limited to one
specific game. Given its success in describing a number of generalized B-A-
R systems, we believe that the Crowd-Anticrowd framework could provide
a powerful approach to describing a wide class of Complex Systems which
mimic competitive multi-agent games. This would be a welcome develop-
ment, given the lack of general theoretical concepts in the field of Complex
Systems as a whole. It is also pleasing from the point of view of physics
methodology, since the basic underlying philosophy of accounting correctly
for ‘inter-particle’ correlations is already known to be successful in more
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Fig. 4. Crowd-Anticrowd theory vs. numerical simulation results for σ in the Mi-
nority Game as a function of memory size m, for N = 101 agents, at S = 2, 4 and
8. At each S value, analytic forms of σ (i.e. standard deviation in excess demand
D[t]) are shown. The numerical values were obtained from different simulation runs
(triangles, crosses and circles). Figure adapted from Ref. [2].
conventional areas of many-body physics. This success in turn raises the in-
triguing possibility that conventional many-body physics might be open to
re-interpretation in terms of an appropriate multi-particle ‘game’: we leave
this for future work.
Of course, some properties of Complex Systems cannot be described using
time- and configuration-averaged expressions as discussed here. In particular,
an observation of a real-world Complex System which is thought to resemble
a multi-agent game, may correspond to a single run which evolves from a
specific initial configuration of agents’ strategies. This implies a particular
Ψ , and hence the time-averagings within the Crowd-Anticrowd theory must
be carried out for that particular choice of Ψ . However this problem can still
be cast in terms of the Crowd-Anticrowd approach, since the averagings are
then just carried out over some sub-set of paths in history space, which is
conditional on the path along which the Complex System is already heading.
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We have been discussing a Complex System based on multi-agent dy-
namics, in which both deterministic and stochastic processes co-exist, and
are indeed intertwined. Depending on the particular rules of the game, the
stochastic element may be associated with any of five areas: (i) disorder as-
sociated with the strategy allocation and hence with the heterogeneity in the
population, (ii) disorder in an underlying network. Both (i) and (ii) might
typically be fixed from the outset (i.e., quenched disorder) hence it is inter-
esting to see the interplay of (i) and (ii) in terms of the overall performance
of the system [8]. The extent to which these two ‘hard-wired’ disorders might
then compensate each other, as for example in the Parrondo effect or stochas-
tic resonance, is an interesting question. Such a compensation effect might be
engineered, for example, by altering the rules-of-the-game concerning inter-
agent communication on the existing network. Three further possible sources
of stochasticity are (iii) tie-breaks in the scores of strategies, (iv) a stochastic
rule in order for each agent to pick which strategy to use from the available S
strategies, as in the Thermal Minority Game, (v) stochasticity in the global
resource level L[t] (e.g. bar seating capacity) due to changing external con-
ditions. To a greater or lesser extent, these five stochastic elements will tend
to break up any deterministic cycles arising in the game. We refer to Ref.
[13] for a discussion of the dynamics of the Minority Game viewed from the
perspective of a stochastically-perturbed deterministic system.
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